Minimum cost spanning tree problems connect agents e¢ ciently to a source when agents are located at di¤erent points and the cost of using an edge is …xed. The folk and cycle-complete cost sharing solutions always o¤er core allocations. We provide similar characterizations for both. A new property is based on the following observation: when all agents have the same cost to connect to the source, we can connect one of them to the source then connect all other agents to him, as if he was the source. Cost sharing should also be done in these two steps. We also use some common properties: Core Selection, Piecewise Linearity and an independence property.
Introduction
Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems model a situation where agents are located at di¤erent points and need to be connected to a source in order to obtain a good or information. Agents do not care if they are connected directly to the source or indirectly through other agents who are. The cost to build a link between two agents or an agent and the source is a …xed number, meaning that the cost is the same whether one or ten agents use that particular link. Mcst problems can be used to model various real-life problems, from telephone and cable TV to water supply networks.
We are interested in the cost sharing problem related to mcst problems. Once agents decide to build the network, the common cost of construction must be split among the participants. The application of the Shapley value to this problem, …rst studied in Bird (1976) and known as the Kar solution (Kar (2002) ), has interesting properties but might be outside of the core, meaning that some coalitions might be better o¤ leaving the group and undertaking the project by themselves. The folk (…rst suggested by Feltkamp et al (1994) and rediscovered independently by Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga (2007) ) and cycle-complete (Trudeau (2012b) ) solutions o¤er similar remedies. Both modify the cost matrix before applying the Shapley value on the modi…ed game. To obtain the modi…cations needed to compute the folk solution, for each pair of agents (or for each agent and the source), we …nd the path between them for which the most expensive edge is as cheap as possible. We then assign that cost to this pair of agents in the modi…ed matrix. For the cycle-complete solution, we proceed in the same manner, but look at cycles instead of paths.
Adding to the similarities of the methods, this paper provides similar characterizations for both solutions. To do so, we introduce a new property called Decomposition. Suppose that all agents have 2 The setting 2.1 Minimum cost spanning tree problems Let N = f1; 2; :::g be the set of potential participants and N N be the set of agents that actually need to be connected to the source, denoted by 0. Let N 0 = N [ f0g : For any set Z N [ f0g ; de…ne Z p as the set of all non-ordered pairs (i; j) of elements of Z: In our context, any element (i; j) of Z + with c e representing the cost of edge e: Let (N ) be the set of all cost vectors when the set of agents is N , with N N . Let be the set of all cost vectors, for all possible N . Since c assigns cost to all edges e, we often abuse language and call c a cost matrix. A minimum cost spanning tree problem is a triple (0; N; c): Since 0 does not change, we omit it in the following and simply identify a mcst problem as (N; c); with N N and c 2 (N ):
A cycle p ll is a set of K 3 edges (i k ; i k+1 ); with k 2 [0; K 1] and such that i 0 = i K = l and i 1 ; :::; i K 1 distinct and di¤erent than l: A path p lm between l and m is a set of K edges (i k ; i k+1 ); with k 2 [0; K 1] ; containing no cycle and such that i 0 = l, i K = m and i 1 ; :::; i K 1 distinct and di¤erent from l and m: Let P lm (N 0 ) be the set of all such paths between l and m: For a set of edges Y 2 N p 0 ; we say that Y is in S N 0 if for all (i; j) 2 Y; i; j 2 S: We say that Y contains a cycle in S if, for all i 2 S; there exists a cycle p ii in S such that all elements of p ii are also in Y: We say that a path p lm is a free path if c e = 0 for all e 2 p lm : 2 A spanning tree is a non-orientated graph without cycles that connects all elements of N 0 : A spanning tree t is identi…ed by the set of its edges. Its associated cost is P e2t c e : The spanning trees with the minimum cost are called minimum cost spanning trees (mcst). It is well known that we can …nd a mcst in polynomial time (Prim (1957 ), Kruskal (1956 ). Let C(N; c) be the cost of these mcst. Let t be one of those mcst and T (c) be the set of all mcst. For any t 2 T (c); p ij (t ) is the unique path from i to j in t : We say that j is a follower of i in c if for all t 2 T (c) there is a k t 2 N 0 n fi; jg such that (i; k t ) 2 p 0j (t ):
Let c S be the restriction of the cost matrix c to the coalition S 0 N 0 : Let C(S; c) be the cost of the mcst of the problem (S; c S ): Given these de…nitions, we say that C is the stand-alone cost function associated with c:
Cost sharing solutions
For a problem (N; c); a cost allocation y 2 R N assigns a cost share to each agent, and the budget balance condition is P i2N y i = C(N; c): A cost sharing solution (or rule) assigns a cost allocation y(N; c) to any admissible mcst problem (N; c): We introduce the two solutions that are the focus of the paper.
From any cost matrix c; we can de…ne the irreducible cost matrix c as follows:
c e for all i; j 2 N 0 :
From any cost matrix c; we can de…ne the cycle-complete cost matrix c as follows:
where c N nfkg ij indicate the cost of edge (i; j) on the matrix that we …rst restricted to agents in N n fkg before transforming into an irreducible matrix.
The cycle complete matrix can also be de…ned using cycles (Trudeau (2012b)): for edge (i; j); we look at cycles that go through i and j: If there is one such cycle such that its most expensive edge is cheaper than a direct connection on edge (i; j); we assign this cost to edge (i; j).
The folk solution is the Shapley value of C( ; c) while the cycle-complete solution is the Shapley value of C( ; c ): The Kar solution y K is simply the Shapley value of C( ; c):
Properties
We use a set of properties that include some familiar ones as well as some new ones. We start by de…ning the new ones.
To introduce the Decomposition property, consider Figure 1a , where agents are identi…ed in bold and other numbers are the cost of the di¤erent edges. All agents have the same cost to connect to the source, with costs to connect two agents together being smaller. An obviously optimal way to construct the mcst is to randomly select one agent to connect to the source, and to then connect everybody else to that agent. Therefore, once we have selected who to connect to the source, the problem becomes as if that agent is the source. Figure 1b shows the resulting problems if we connect one of the agents to the source.
The Decomposition property goes through with that idea not only for building the mcst, but also for sharing its cost. More precisely, if i was selected to be connected to the source, he pays that cost, while the cost to connect the remaining agents is computed on the reduced problem where i acts as the source. Since agent i pays more than others, it is not fair to him. To recover fairness, every agent takes Figure 1 : Illustration of Decomposition its turn being the source, and we take the average. Decomposition has a nice consistency implication, as it treats in the same manner problems where agents all have to connect to a given node, regardless of the fact that this node contains the source or an agent.
The property bears resemblance to the Problem Separation property of Trudeau (2013), which also aims to divide the connection to the source from the connection between agents. The main di¤erence is that Problem Separation has a larger scope, applying in cases where agents have di¤erent direct connection costs to the source. There is also a di¤erent treatment of the problem of connecting agents together. The larger scope results in the cycle-complete solution failing to satisfy the Problem Separation property. While Decomposition has a limited scope, in the cases where it applies the interpretation and relevance of the process is absolutely natural.
We now formally de…ne the property. Let c 0i be such that for all j; k 2 N n fig ; c 0i 0j = c ij and c 0i jk = c jk : It is the cost matrix that represents the situation when we assume that agent i is the source. C( ; c 0i ) is the corresponding stand-alone game, de…ned over the set of agents N n fig : Letĉ be such that for all i 2 N;ĉ 0i = c 0i ; whileĉ ij = 0 for all i; j 2 N: Then, all that is left are the costs to connect agents to the source. The mcst is such that one agent is connected to the source and all others are connected to him (at no cost sinceĉ ij = 0 for all i; j 2 N ):
Decomposition: For any mcst problem (N; c) such that c 0i = a; c jk a for all i; j; k 2 N; we have y i (N; c) = P Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga (2007) and Trudeau (2013) . These properties state that if we can split our agents into two groups that can be connected independently to the source, then we can do the cost sharing separately on these two groups. The property we introduce also applies this independence to di¤erent branches of the mcst.
Consider Figure 2a , where (one of) the mcst is identi…ed by the dashed lines. Agents 1 and 2 form a branch that connects independently to the source. Even more, the edges between f1; 2g and f3g are all at least as expensive as the edges connecting these agents to the source, meaning that there are never any gains in using them. Since groups f1; 2g and f3g have no gains to cooperate together, we might as well treat them separately. Our Branch Cutting property, just like Group Independence, says that in that case, we can remove agent 3 from the problem to compute the shares of agents 1 and 2; and vice-versa. Branch Cutting, however, implies more. Consider Figure 2b . Agents 1 and 2 still have no gains to cooperate with agent 3, but now instead of connecting independently to the source, they connect independently to agent 4, who has an advantageous connection to the source. While Group Independence says nothing about this case, we argue that this situation is no di¤erent than the one in Figure 2a , and that we should still be able to remove agent 3 to compute the shares of agents 1 and 2, and vice-versa. The Branch Cutting property does just that. Just like the name of the property alludes to, if two branches of the mcst are independent, we should be able to "cut" one of them and compute the shares of the other branch using that reduced problem.
1
Suppose that the branch that we are considering connects at node k: We further restrict the application of this property to cases where the edges within the branch are at least as costly as the most expensive edge on an optimal path from the source to k: In those cases, when building the mcst, agent k will be connected to the source before any member of the branch. Once k is connected to the source, it remains to connect members of the branch to k; with these members having no interest in being connected to anybody else.
We allow k to be the source; in that case, Branch Cutting is equivalent to the Group Independence property of Trudeau (2013) .
We now formally de…ne the property. To de…ne the restricted games once we have removed some branches, we need the following notation. Since for t; t 0 2 T (c); max e2p 0k(t) c e = max e2p 0k(t 0 ) c e ; let p 0k (c) max e2p 0k(t) c e : For k 2 N 0 and S N n fkg ; let c k;S 2 (S [ fkg) be such that c k;S 0k = p 0k (c) and c k;S ij = c ij for all i; j 2 S 0 [ fkg, with (i; j) 6 = (0; k): By convention, there is no cost to the path p 00 and a problem (S [ f0g ; c 0;S ) is the same as (S; c S ): Branch Cutting: For any mcst problem (N; c), if there exists S N and k 2 N 0 nS such that i) for all i 2 S; i is a follower of k in c, ii) for all i 2 S; j 2 N n(S [ fkg); c ij max fc 0i ; c 0j g and iii)
In words, condition i) makes sure that S forms a branch that always connects to the source through k; condition ii) guarantees that there are no gains to connect with other agents and iii) that the costs within the branch are no cheaper than the costs on the path from the source to k: Notice that if k = f0g ; conditions i) and iii) impose no restrictions: Notice also that the property says nothing about the cost share of k; as that agent has relationships with both S and N n (S [ fkg) : It is however easy to …nd it by using Budget Balance, given that we have the shares of all other agents.
The next three properties, Full, Equal and Constant Share of Cost Reduction, are very close to each other, providing di¤erent solutions to this problem: suppose that nobody has a cheaper connection to the source than agent i, and that everybody can connect to him freely. Then, if the cost of connecting i to the source diminishes, all else being equal, how should we split the savings? One possibility is to reward agent i for the lower cost and assign him all the savings. This is particularly natural if agent i took actions that resulted in the cost reduction, or if he has property rights over that edge to the source. We obtain the following property:
Full Share The di¤erence between FSCR and ESCR being mostly a di¤erence in the way we interpret the game, it seems very natural to assume that once we settled on an interpretation of that game (even if it's on something di¤erent than the ones that inspired FSCR and ESCR), we should stick to it. Therefore, the way we deal with this kind of problems should be consistent throughout. This idea is expressed in the following property:
Constant Share We can see the property as …rst assigning to each agent 1 jN j of the savings, before reallocating to agent i a share of the savings that were …rst assigned to the agents in N n fig : The value of conveys the responsibility we assign to agent i in the reduction of the cost. Two natural values of are = 0 and = 1; corresponding respectively to ESCR and FSCR.
We now move to the familiar properties, starting with Piecewise Linearity, which says that if we can decompose a cost matrix into submatrices where the cost of all edges are ordered in the same manner as the original matrix, then the cost allocation on the original cost matrix should equal the sum of the cost allocations on the submatrices. This property (or similar versions), a weaker version than the classical Additivity property in the general setting (…rst proposed by Shapley (1953)), has been used in Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga (2009) , Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) , Branzei et al (2004) and Tijs et al (2006) . Piecewise Linearity generates a rich class of solutions having a simple structure. Cost shares can be de…ned on simple elementary matrices where costs of all edges are either 0 or 1, making it particularly appealing.
Piecewise Linearity: If a solution satisfying Piecewise Linearity is well de…ned on e ; it is also uniquely de…ned on : Let y be a solution de…ned over e . The piecewise linear extension of y is a solution y
The …nal property is the familiar Core Selection property, a stability property that guarantees that no coalition pays more than its stand-alone cost.
Core Selection: For any mcst problem (N; c) and any S N; P i2S y i (N; c) C(S; c):
Results
Before stating the main results, we introduce the following notation. Let^ e be the set of elementary matrices where all agents have a cost of one to connect to the source and of zero to connect to another agent: c 0i = 1 and c ij = 0 for all i; j: Let F (c) = fi 2 N jc 0i = 0 g be the set of agents having a free direct connection to the source.
We …rst show that a cost sharing solution satis…es Piecewise Linearity, Core Selection, Decomposition, Branch Cutting and Constant Share of Cost Reduction if and only if it is a convex combination of the folk and cycle-complete solutions. Proof. Lemma A.1 in Appendix shows that the folk and cycle-complete solutions satisfy the properties. It is then obvious that any convex combination also satisfy them. We show that with Piecewise Linearity, Core Selection, Decomposition, Branch Cutting and CSCR, a cost sharing solution is uniquely de…ned by the value of used in CSCR.
We proceed as follows: in Step 1, we show that solutions that satis…es the properties coincide for all c 2^ e : In Step 2, we do the same for any elementary cost matrices when jN j = 2: Using an induction argument, we extend the result to any elementary cost matrix and any number of players in Step 3. In Step 4, we extend to any cost matrix using Piecewise Linearity. Since the values found depend on the parameter used in CSCR, in Step 5 we show that the properties impose that be between 0 and 1. In Step 6, we show that the remaining values are the convex combination of the folk and cycle-complete solutions.
Step 1: Show that all solutions satisfying the properties coincide for allĉ 2^ e : Take c 2 (N ) such that c e = 1 for all edges: By Core Selection, y i (N; c) = 1 for all i 2 N: By Decomposition, y i (N; c) = y i (N;ĉ)+ : Since solutions that satisfy the properties coincide for problems (N;ĉ), (N n fjg ; c 0j ) (as jN n fjgj = 1; we must have that y i (N n fjg ; c 0j ) = c 0j 0i = c ij by Budget Balance); they also coincide for problem (N; c). If jF (c)j = 1 and c ij = 0; we can apply CSCR to …nd a unique cost allocation (for each value of in that property) . If c ij = 1; then by Core Selection y k (N; c) = c 0k for all k 2 N:
If jF (c)j = 2; by Core Selection we must have that y i (N; c) = 0 for all i 2 N:
Step 3: Show that all solutions satisfying the properties coincide for all c 2 e : Suppose now that all solutions that satisfy the properties coincide for all c 2 e (N ) with jN j = m 2: We show that it implies that they coincide for all c 2 e (N ) with jN j = m + 1:
If jF (c)j = 0; we can apply Decomposition and y i (N; c) = y i (N;ĉ) + First, suppose that there exists S N such for i 2 S and j 2 N nS; c ij max(c 0i ; c 0j ): Then, we can use Branch Cutting (with k = f0g) and thus y i (N; c) = y i (S; c S ) for all i 2 S and y j (N; c) = y j (N nS; c N nS ) for all j 2 N nS: The solutions satisfying the properties all coincide on these problems as jSj ; jN nSj m.
For the following, we suppose that there is a free path in N (that does not go through the source) between any two agents i; j 2 N . We have two further cases: i) We have i 2 N nF (c) and k 2 N n fig such that i is a follower of k in c Let S be the set of all followers of k in c: As c is an elementary matrix, this implies that all free paths between the source and i include agent k and that k has a free path to the source. Condition iii) of Branch Cutting is trivially satis…ed. Condition ii) also has to be satis…ed: Suppose there was an agent l in N n (S [ fkg) to which an agent m in S had a free direct connection to. If l can provide a free path to the source that does not include k; m wouldn't be a follower of k: If l doesn't provide such a path, he is also a follower of k: We can thus apply Branch Cutting and y i (N; c) = y i (S [ fkg ; c k;S ) for all i 2 S while y j (N; c) = y j (N nS; c N nS ) for all j 2 N nS: The solutions satisfying the properties all coincide on these problems as jS [ fkgj ; jN nSj m: By Budget Balance, Step 4: Show that all solutions satisfying the properties coincide for all c 2 : By Steps 1-3, the solutions satisfying the properties all coincide on problems (N; c) such that c 2 e (for a given value in CSCR). By Piecewise Linearity, they also coincide for any c 2 :
Step 5 Step 6: Show that y = (1 )y f + y cc : We …rst show that it is true for c 2 e (N ) with jN j = 2: Let N = fi; jg ; c be such that c 0i = c 0j = 1; c ij = 0 and c 0 be such that c The result is also immediate for any other c 2 e (N ) with jN j = m: The results than extends to any c 2 using Piecewise Linearity.
Notice that even though CSCR puts no constraints on the value of (which represents the extra share of the cost savings going to the agent who has a low cost to the source), the other properties restrict it to be between 0 and 1; which were the two natural values we had identi…ed. They also correspond to the Equal Share of Cost Reduction and Full Share of Cost Reduction properties respectively. Using theses properties instead of Constant Share of Cost Reduction allows us to uniquely characterize the folk and cycle-complete solutions. Proof. Lemma A.1 in Appendix show that the folk solution satis…es the properties. We show that there is a unique solution that satis…es the properties. Let y(N; c) be a solution that satis…es the properties.
Take c 2 e and suppose that we have S such that for all i 2 S; j 2 N nS; c ij = 1:
Therefore, in the following, we only consider c such that we have a free path in N between any pair of agents i; j 2 N:
We …rst show that for all c 2 e such that c 0i = 1 for all i 2 N and such that there exists a free path between any agents j; k 2 N; we have that y i (N; c) = N n fig ; c) = 0 for all i 2 N; as no agent depends on i to connect to the source at no cost. The only allocation that satis…es Core Selection is y i (N; c) = 0 for all i 2 N:
We have shown that all solutions that satisfy the properties coincide for problems (N; c) such that c 2 e . By Piecewise Linearity, they also coincide if c 2 : Independence of the properties is shown in Lemma A.3 in Appendix.
Discussion
The folk and cycle-complete solutions are Shapley values applied to di¤erent versions of the same game. It is therefore not surprising that they share many properties. Their convex combination is characterized by the properties of Piecewise Linearity, Core Selection, Decomposition, Branch Cutting and Constant Share of Cost Reduction. It is worth noting that the Kar solution, another Shapley value, satis…es all properties except Core Selection and Equal Share of Cost Reduction.
Interestingly, the characterizations of the folk solution di¤ers from that of the cycle-complete solution only by the use of Equal Share of Cost Reduction instead of Full Share of Cost Reduction. This shows that the folk solution is fundamentally di¤erent in its approach from the cycle complete solution (as well as the Kar solution): it treats a good connection to the source as common property, with savings on its cost being shared equally by everyone who uses that connection. By opposition, the cycle-complete solution fully rewards an agent that sees the cost of its connection to the source decrease. The relevant approach to choose depends on the particular characteristic of the application being considered, notably the responsibility of the agent in that reduction in cost or in his choice of location.
While Theorem 2 o¤ers the …rst characterization of the cycle-complete solutions, there has been many characterizations of the folk solutions, notably in Vidal-Puga (2007, 2009) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) . However, as shown in Trudeau (2012a) they all depend on the Reductionism property, that says that cost shares depend only on the irreducible matrix. The characterization proposed in Theorem 3 avoids using such a property that is very close to the method itself. 
Decomposition: Since c ij c 0k for all i; j; k 6 = 0; the Decomposition of the problem does not a¤ect the computation of the irreducible matrix, as the path between i; j 2 N that has the cheapest most expensive edge will be the same whether we look over the edges in N 0 or N: Similarly, the path between i and the source with the cheapest most expensive will always be such that its most expensive edge is the edge connecting an agent and the source. We can show that
Since C(fjg ; c) = C(fjg ; c) = a for all j 2 N; we have that
C(fi; jg ; c) (jN j 1) jN j and thus that
As we have that y f (N;ĉ) = x jN j for all j 2 N: We can also see that it implies that FSCR is not satis…ed. ii) Piecewise Linearity: In Trudeau (2012b), the cycle-complete solution is de…ned using elementary matrices. Piecewise Linearity is obviously satis…ed.
Branch Cutting: Suppose that there exists S N and k 2 N nS such that i) for all i 2 S; i is a follower of k in c, ii) for all i 2 S; j 2 N n(S [ fkg); c ij max fc 0i ; c 0j g and iii) c ii 0
If there is a cycle in c that includes i; j 2 S [ fkg, that is within S 0 ; and for which the most expensive edge is cheaper than c ij ; the same cycle will be present in c k;S : The same result holds for a cycle within N nS: The only possible cycle that can involve i 2 S 0 and j 2 N 0 n (S [ fkg) and such that its most expensive edge is cheaper than c ij has to go through the source. By assumptions ii and iii), the most expensive edge in that cycle can only be within S [ fkg : In addition, since c k;S 0k = p 0k (c); the same cycle will be present in c k;S ; with the edge (0; k) replacing (one of) the optimal path(s) p 0k :
for all i; j 2 S 0 [ fkg and c lm = c N nS lm for all l; m 2 N 0 nS: It also implies that c ij max c 0i ; c 0j for all i 2 S and j 2 N nS: Therefore, for any R S and T N n(S [ fkg) we have that C(R [ T; c ) = C(R; c ) + C(T; c ). By the properties of the Shapley value we have that
Decomposition: Since c ij c 0k for all i; j; k 6 = 0; the Decomposition of the problem does not a¤ect the computation of the cycle-complete matrix, as the cycle including i; j 2 N that has the cheapest most expensive edge will be the same whether we look over the edges in N 0 or N: As Decomposition only applies when c 0i = a and c jk a for all i; j; k 2 N; c 0i = c 0i =ĉ 0i for all i 2 N: Therefore, for any i 2 N and S N n fig Proof. Let 1 (N ) be the elementary cost matrices c such i) there exists a free cycle that covers all agents in N and ii) jF (c)j = 0 or 1:
Suppose that we wish to build a solution that satis…es Piecewise Linearity, Core Selection, Branch Cutting and FSCR, and that we have already de…ned values for all problems (N; c) such that jN j K and c 2 e (N ); with K 3: We show that it implies unique values for all c 2 e (N )n 1 (N ) for all N such that jN j = K + 1: From the proof of Theorem 1, Decomposition is used to …nd shares for problems (N; c) when c 2 e (N ); with K 3 Suppose that F (c) = fig Suppose that F (c) = ;: Since we have de…ned unique cost shares for all cases where jF (c)j = 1 and c contains no free cycle over N , we can use FSCR to …nd unique shares for all cases where jF (c)j = 0 and c contains no free cycle over N:
If jF (c)j 2; we can use the same procedure as the proof of Theorem 1, as it does not use Decomposition. Therefore, we have de…ned unique values for all c 2 e (N )n 1 (N ) for all N such that jN j = K + 1:
To de…ne shares over any c; we are left with the task to de…ne unique shares for c 2 1 (N ); with jN j > K: We would have then de…ned unique shares for any elementary cost matrix. By Piecewise Linearity, we can then extend to any cost matrix.
Let y 1 (N; c) = y K (N; c) if jN j 4 and c 2 1 (N ) and y 1 (N; c) = y cc (N; c) for any other c 2 e (N ); jN j 4: Use the method above to …nd unique cost shares for any c 2 e : Use Piecewise Linearity to extend to any c 2 : We can show that y 1 satis…es Piecewise Linearity, Core Selection (as y cc satis…es it, and y K (N; c) is in the core for all c 2 1 (N ), Branch Cutting (as it cannot be applied on any c 2 1 (N )) and FSCR (as it is satis…ed by both y cc and y K ): We show that it fails Decomposition. Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and c be such that c 12 = c 13 = c 14 = c 23 = c 34 = 0 and c e = 1 else. We have a free cycle that covers N and thus y(N; c) = y K (N; c) = Let 3 (N ) be such that there exists fi; j; kg 2 N such that c ij = 0; c 0i = 1; c 0j = c ik = c jk = 2, c 0k = 3 and c lm c 0l for all l 2 fi; j; kg and m 2 N n fi; j; kg :
